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The principal case does not fall within cases designated type one,
supra, since the stool in the aisle is not a defect to be anticipated and
guarded against by a customer as would water on the floor on a rainy
day or the slippery conditions of waxed floors. The cases in type two
and three, supra, are very similar as far as fact situations are concerned,
and the case under consideration could conceivably be placed into either
classification. Since it is extremely difficult, in many instances, for the
plaintiff to obtain evidence as to how long a defect has existed or as to
the defendant's actual knowledge of its existence, some courts might
take a liberal view as to the requirement of such specific evidence. If the
plaintiff is to be required to offer positive evidence to show that the de-
fendant placed the stool in the aisle or that it had been there an un-
reasonable length of time, it is impossible for her to make out a case, be-
cause she cannot show such a state of facts. DoRis MESSER
PRIVILEGE - LAWYER AND CLIENT - INSURER AND INSURED
- DISCOVERY.
In March 1932, one Meyer Plost was injured by an automobile
driven by Joseph Scharff. Two years later he died and an action for
wrongful death was instituted by his widow. The action was against
the Avondale Motor Car Company. The plaintiff's petition alleged
that the driver of the fatal car, Scharff, was an employee and agent
of the company at the time of the accident. The Defendant denied the
agency and also any responsibility for the injuries or death suffered by
Meyer Plost.
Later the plaintiff caused subpoenas duces tecum to be issued upon
George L. Ten Eyck, the vice-president and general manager of the
Avondale Motor Car Company, demanding the production of a casualty
report made by the said company or by any of its officers or employees, or
by Joseph Scharff to any insurance or indemnity Company, or to any
agent or attorney of any insurance or indemnity company concerning
the casualty.
A similar subpoena duces tecum was served on Gordon Bennett,
secretary of the A. R. Witham Insurance Agency demanding the same
report. It appeared that insurance was written by the Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Company, through the above agency, insuring the
Avondale Motor Car Company against liability for damages caused
by negligent acts of its salesmen.
George Ten Eyck and Gordon Bennett refused to produce the
casualty report and testified that it was no longer in their possession but
was in the possession of Richard Remke, attorney representing the
Avondale Motor Car Company and the Lumbermen's Insurance Com-
pany, and on the further ground that it constituted a privileged com-
munication. The Trial court held their report not privileged and
sentenced the two for contempt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the report consti-
tuted a privileged communication as between lawyer and client and
purged Ten Eyck and Bennett of contempt. In re Keimann, 132 Ohio
St. 187.
In this case the Supreme Court of Ohio has affirmed its stand
taken in the case of Ex-Parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. I, 77 N.E. 276
(i9o6) where it was held that a report of an accident made by the
motorman of the defendant traction company and sent by him to the
company to be turned over to their claim agent from whence it got into
the hands of the company's lawyer was within the lawyer-client privi-
lege. This view was followed in dtlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v.
Vdilams 21 Ga. App. 753, 94 S.E. 584 (1917). The Schoepf case
was annotated in 6 L.R.A. (N. 5) 325 and was then said to be against
the great weight of authority.
The English rule is that such a report is not privileged. Woolley v.
N. London Ry. 38 L.J., C.P. 317 (1869); Parr v. L. C. & D. Ry.,
24 L.T. 558 (1881); Fenner v. L. & S. E. Ry., 41 L.J., O.B. 313
(1872). In the case of Cook v. North Metropolitan Tramway Co.
54 J.P. 262 (1862) the court held that a document is not protected
from inspection on the ground that it was made for the purpose, in the
event of litigation, of being laid before the defendant's solicitor to be used
by him for the purposes of the defense to any action, if any action should
be brought. If, however, a report is procurred at the instigation of
counsel after action has been brought, it seems dear that such a report is
privileged. Goldstone v. Williams Deacon and Company, 68 L.J. Ch.
24 (1889).
Many courts in this country have also followed a rule at variance
with the Schoepf case. Thus in the Virginia Carolina Chemical Com-
pany v. Knight io6 Va. 674, 56 S.E. 725 (1907) a report that was
made by the superintendent of the defendant company immediately
after the accident was held not to be a privileged communication. This
report was prepared on paper headed "Immediate Report of Accident"
and was sent directly to the attorneys of the Travelers' Insurance Com-
pany in which company the defendant had a policy of indemnity. The
document was prepared before any action had been brought or
threatened. In Carlton v. The Western and Atlantic Railroad Com-
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pany 8I Ga. 531, 7 S.E. 623 (1888) a conductor of the company
under standing rules of the company, made a written report of the
accident concerning the plaintiff's injuries and the surrounding circum-
stances. The court in this case did not require the defendant to pro-
duce the document but the holding was based on the fact that the plain-
tiff had erroneously proceeded. He had not made an oath as to the
materiality of the document or even whether the defendant had it in his
possession. The court said, "Had the requirements of the statute been
complied with, we see no reason why the paper should not have been
produced. We do not understand such a report to be a privileged com-
munication." In Lacoss et. al. v. Town of Lebanon ef al., 78 N.H.
413, loi At. 364 (1917) the defendant made a sketch and photo-
graph of the scene of the accident after the injury to the plaintiff. He
contended that they were made to enable him to defend against any
suit that might be brought as a result thereof. The court held that
these documents, instead of being communications from client to at-
torney, were made to perpetuate the evidence of the accident. The
court then said that the client cannot escape his duty of discovering
material by handing it to his attorney.
Many Canadian courts have taken a similar stand on the problem
and have made even more emphatic statements against holding such
documents to be privileged. Thus in the case of Savage v. The Cana-
dian Pacific Railway 16 Man, L.R. 381 (i9o6) the court held, in a
case involving facts similar to the Schoepf case, that if the documents
had been prepared solely for or under the instructions of the defendant
company's attorney and had -been prepared especially for litigation and
in contemplation thereof then they would have been privileged. How-
ever, the court then held that where the documents were prepared partly
for the above purposes and partly for other purposes they were not
privileged. This same result was reached in Swaisland v. Grand Trunk
Railway Company 5 D.L.R. 750, 30 W.N. 96o (1912). Grain
Claims Bureau Ltd. v.Cain Surety Company (1927) 4 D.L.R. 297,
Smith v. C. N. R. 2 D. L. R. (1926; 72 Betts v. Grand Trunk Ral-
way Company 120 P. R. 86 (1887).
In the principal case, the report was made by the defendant motor
car company to its insurance company. The report was made in ac-
cordance with the provisions in the insurance policy. Was the report
privileged while in the hands of the insurance company, and if so, upon
what grounds? The insurance company has agreed to pretect the motor
car company from liability. It needs the fullest information in order to
determine its liability and to protect itself from fraudulent claims. In
many cases the problem would be submitted to a lawyer and some pay-
ments would be made only after litigation. Yet it seems difficult to say
that the report is made under the benefit of the lawyer-client privilege
when the writer of the report may not know even the name of the
lawyer.
If the report is not privileged in the hands of the insurance com-
pany, does it become privileged upon being turned over to a lawyer?
Numerous cases hold that a document which could be reached in the
hands of a client does not become privileged by being turned over to a
lawyer. Edison Electric Light Company v. United States Electric
Lighting Company 44 F. 294 (189o); Zllen v. Hartford Life In-
surance Company et al. 72 Conn. 693; 45 Ad. 955 (19oo); A4ndrews
v. the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, 14 Ind. 169 (i86o);
In re Cunnion's Will 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N.E. 648; Am. Cas. 1912
Ad. 834 (1911); Jones et. a. v. Reilly et al. 174 N.Y. 97; 66 N.E.
649 (1903) ; Pearson v. Yoder et al. 134 Pac. 421, 39 Okla. 105, 48
L.R.A. (N.S.) 334 (1913). The court points out that a document
would be privileged if it came into existence as a communication by a
client to his attorney. This is supported in 5 Wigmore on Evidence
(2nd Ed.), 67 Section 2318. There has been a line of reasoning ad-
vanced in Ohio that the communication, to be privileged, must be of
such a character that it would not have been made except for the relation
of attorney-client. Smart v. Master and Wardens of N. C. Lodge 6o
Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 15, 17 Ohio C.D. 273; affirmed without opinion
in 73 Ohio St. 387 (1905). In the English case of Collins vs. The
London General Omnibus Company 63 L.J. (Q.B.) 428 (1893) in-
volving facts similar to the principal case with the additional factor that
the injured party had written a complaint to the defendant company
before the report of the, in that case, conductor was obtained, the court
held that such a report was privileged. The decision was placed upon the
ground that the document had been made for the purpose of obtaining
the advice of the defendant's solicitor with reference to an anticipated
action which might reasonably be apprehended. So also, in the case of
The Birmingham and Midland Motor 0. Company v. London and
N. TV. Railway Company 3 K.B. 85o (913) the court stated that it
was not necessary that the information was obtained "solely" or
"merely" or "primarily" for the solicitor in the sense of being procured
as materials upon which professional advice should be taken in pro-
ceedings pending, or threatened, or anticipated. The same result was
reached in the later case of The Hopper No. 13, 94 L.J.P. 45 (1925)-
These cases are supported by the Canadian case of United Motor Com-
tany v. Regina 8 W.W.R. x85.
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Thus in the principal case, a letter by an officer of the Motor Car
Company to his lawyer would be clearly within the privilege. But this
report was made to an insurance company. The court points out that
the communication was not made in the ordinary course of the busi-
ness of the Motor Car Company. This is true, but it seems far short of
being equivalent to a document that came into existence as a communica-
tion by a client to his attorney. It would seem that a document which
is not privileged in the hands of a client should not become so upon
being turned over to the attorney. Such an extension of the lawyer-
client privilege would seem to be unwarranted.
It may well be asked, "Just how is this report material to the plain-
tiff's case?" The cause of action is for a negligent injury and death.
It is not based on a writing. If the report contained any admission of
liability and was not otherwise privileged, the plaintiff, if he could
obtain possession, could offer it in evidence. Otherwise, it would not
seem to be admissible. It has been held that reports made to the general
manager by the superintendents and conductors, several days after the
accident, were not admissible against the company as res gestae or ad-
missions. Carroll v. The East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Rail-
way Company 82 Ga. 452, io S.E. 163 (1889); Gully v. N. Pacific
Railway Company 35 Wash. 241, 99 Pac. 202 (1904). The Sec-
tions of the Ohio General Code dealing with discovery are very broad.
Ohio G.C. Sec. I1552 states that: "Either party, or his attorney, in
writing, may demand of the adverse party an inspection and copy, or
permission to take a copy, of a book, paper, or document in his possess-
ion, or under his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of
the action or defense, specifying the book, paper, or document with
sufficient particularity to enable the other party to distinguish it. .. ."
Thus a party to an action is enabled to obtain documents that are in
the possession of the adverse party but which documents are necessary
to prepare proper pleadings or to make other necessary preparations for
trial. Copies of instruments on which an action or defense is founded
may be secured. Obviously the doctrine has many beneficial effects. In
many complicated transactions one party is justly aided by an investiga-
tion of records in the possession of the other.
But is it to the advantage of the public to permit the plaintiff to
obtain a report of an accident made by the defense to his casualty com-
pany? Such insurance should be encouraged and a settlement of claims
without resort to litigation should also be encouraged. It would seem
that there is no encouragement to either if the plaintiff may inspect such
reports in the hope of finding damaging admissions.
It would seem that there are public policy arguments which should
privilege such reports from inspection and production. It is not so easy
to accomplish this purpose in the face of Ohio G. C. Sec. 11552. It
might be done by limiting the effect of that section. Thus in the
Ex tarte Schoepf case (supra) the court said, "The efforts of the plain-
tiff appear to us to be directed toward a 'fishing' for the nature' of the
defense and persons by whom it is to be established, rather than to obtain
competent and necessary evidence to sustain the plaintiff's petition." In
the principal case the court reaches the same result by an extension of the
lawyer-client privilege. If this view is to be followed, it would seem
that the report should be privileged while it is in the hands of the in-
surance company as well as in the hands of the attorney. While this
may seem to enlarge the privilege of lawyer and client, it seems less
objectionable than a doctrine that a document which could be subpoenaed
while in the hands of a client may find sanctuary in the hands of an
attorney. PHILIP J. WOLF
LABOR LAW
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SIT-DOWN STRIKE.
The latest weapon in the ceaseless conflict between capital and labor
is the sit-down strike. It is a swift moving effective technique that has
served labor well in recent months. The success of the General Motor's
strike is an indication that it will be utilized more and more by organized
labor.
It is recognized by this writer that the legal aspect of the sit-down
strike situation is a comparatively unimportant portion of the whole
problem. The economic and social ramifications of such a class struggle
are interwoven into the controversy to such a degree that accepted legal
theory has been relegated to a position of secondary importance. Grant-
ing that this be true, the legal questions involved are still of sufficient
significance to warrant a synopsis of the subject. In view of the recent
development of this technique there is little case law to guide the courts.
Thus a review of the general law relative to strikes is necessary.
In Ohio the right to strike has been upheld in numerous decisions:
Parker v. Bricklayers' Union, io Ohio Dec. Rep. 458, 21 Wkly. L.
Bull. 223 (1889); Brown Mfg. Co. v. Union, 12 Ohio Dec. (N.P.)
753 (19o2); The La France Electrical Construction and Supply Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 8, et al., lO8
Ohio St. 6I, 14o N.E. 897 (1923).
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